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Indiana in the Midst of #MeToo:
The Argument for Enforcing
Arbitration in Sexual Harassment
Claims
Jonathan Cisneros*
I.

Introduction
In the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court issued
some important decisions regarding mandatory arbitration
clauses and agreements. On April 27, 2011, the Court ruled
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state laws that “stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.”1
Furthermore, on May 21, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis in which it reaffirmed its
position that “Congress has instructed that arbitration
agreements . . . must be enforced as written.”2
It does not appear that there is much room for
exceptions to mandatory arbitration agreements based on
these recent Supreme Court decisions. However, the FAA
still preserves the traditional state law defenses to arbitration
such as duress, unconscionability, or fraud. 3 Despite the
Court’s stance on arbitration agreements and provisions, in
the face of the “#MeToo” movement, a few states, including
New York, New Jersey, Vermont, Washington, California,
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law;
M.S.Ed. 2019, Indiana University – Bloomington, Indiana; B.A. 2017,
Valparaiso University – Valparaiso, Indiana.
1
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
2
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
3
Triston O’Savio, Does FAA Prevent States from Barring Mandatory
Arbitration?,
CORP.
COUNS.
BUS.
J.
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://ccbjournal.com/articles/does-faa-prevent-states-from-barringmandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/T9ZN-MS6Q].
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and Maryland, have passed laws banning mandatory
arbitration clauses that restrict sexual harassment claims. 4
These states have essentially carved out exceptions for
sexual harassment claims where mandatory arbitration
agreements or clauses would apply, arguing that they
“discourage employees from pursuing claims of sexual
harassment and conceal alleged employer misconduct from
the public.”5 As of now, only the New York and California
laws have been challenged.6
The movement does not seem to be affecting
Indiana though, at least not in the mandatory arbitration
realm.7 This is, in part, due to Indiana’s conservative nature
and its public policy to favor arbitration proceedings.8 The
Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act states that “[a] written
agreement to submit to arbitration is valid, and enforceable,
an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is
valid and enforceable, except upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”9 When
construing arbitration agreements, all doubts are resolved in
favor of arbitration; however, courts do not “extend
arbitration agreements beyond the clear language of the
agreement and . . . will not extend arbitration agreements by
construction or implication.”10
There is an obvious and growing interest among
states to provide greater protection for those employees
seeking remedies for sexual harassment in the workplace
outside of arbitration. Indiana’s lack of a legislative reaction,
Id.
Id.
6
Id.
7
Olivia Covington, Attorneys, Arbitrators: #MeToo Isn’t Changing
Employment Arbitration Agreements, IND. LAW. (May 1, 2018),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/46885-mandating-resolutions
[https://perma.cc/6DRQ-T23Y].
8
Id.
9
IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1 (2020).
10
Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 88 N.E.3d 188,
194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
4
5
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in this sense, stands in contrast to the aforementioned
reactions in other states. A deeper analysis into the issue
may shed light on Indiana’s most likely action or inaction on
the matter moving forward. Such an analysis may also
indicate why its response may be in its best interest
considering highly probable preemption issues and the
broader picture surrounding individual instances of
mandatory arbitration in the state and individuals generally.
This note argues that it is in the best interest of
sexual harassment victims and the state of Indiana to not
follow suit in passing legislation that prohibits employers
from requiring mandatory arbitration in sexual harassment
cases. This is based on an analysis of the potential factors
underlying Indiana’s current lack of legislative movement,
the weight of the arguments for and against mandatory
arbitration, and consideration of the preemption issues
surrounding state laws banning mandatory arbitration. Part
II sets the foundation for this note by laying out the most
pertinent parts of the FAA and analyzing how the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted this statute—specifically
within the employment context. Part III looks at the
development of the #MeToo movement and how it
influenced a wave of legislative action at the state level. Part
IV narrows the focus by looking at Indiana’s current stance
on mandatory arbitration agreements based on both statutory
and case law. Finally, Part V argues that it is in the best
interest of both sexual harassment victims and Indiana for
the state to refrain from passing legislation that bans the
enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements in the
employment context for cases of sexual harassment. This
argument is based on an analysis of the pros and cons of such
legislation, particularly focusing on contradicting the
#MeToo movement’s lead arguments in favor of such
legislation, and the undeniable barrier to such legislation
regarding preemption under the FAA.
II.
The Federal Arbitration Act in the U.S. Supreme
Court
177
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A.
What is the Federal Arbitration Act?
President Coolidge signed the FAA on February 12,
1925, in order to create a national policy favoring arbitration
agreements.11 It is codified at and encompasses the entire
Title 9 of the United States Code; however, the most
pertinent and substantive parts of the Act are found in
Sections 1 and 2.12 Section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction,
or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.13
Congress enacted Section 2 with the intent and hope
to promote the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements. 14 While this section seems to only apply to
written contracts involving maritime transactions or
transactions involving commerce, the scope of “a transaction
involving commerce” or what is sufficient evidence to show
such a transaction has often been a point of contention. 15
However, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, the
Supreme Court settled some of the confusion by finding that
the words “involving commerce” in Section 2 were meant to
JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 2
(2017).
12
9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (2020).
13
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2020).
14
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 11.
15
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 11, at 3.
11
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include Congress’ broad power to regulate commerce. 16
Furthermore, the Court found that Section 2 applied to all
contracts involving commerce, not just those that
contemplated interstate commerce.17
Section 1 is the FAA’s exemption clause and
importantly defines “maritime transactions” and “commerce”
as used in Section 2.18 It states:
“Maritime transactions,” as herein defined,
means charter parties, bills of lading of
water carriers, agreements relating to
wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or
repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other
matters in foreign commerce which, if the
subject of controversy, would be embraced
within admiralty jurisdiction; “commerce”,
as herein defined, means commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations,
or in any Territory of the United States or
in the District of Columbia, or between any
such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia
and any State or Territory or foreign nation,
but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.19
The exemption under Section 1 is a seemingly
narrow one on its face that only applies to “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 (1995).
Id. at 278.
18
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2020).
19
9 U.S.C. § 1.
16
17
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commerce.”20 However, this exemption was also frequently
contested. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved this
matter in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.21 This decision
had a major impact on the landscape of mandatory
arbitration agreements in the employment context.22
B.
Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration
Under the FAA
In Circuit City Stores, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the FAA covers all employment agreements that
require arbitration to resolve work-related disputes. 23 It
further held that employment contracts excluded by Section
1 are limited to seamen, railroad employees, and other
transportation employees.24
Saint Clair Adams applied for a job in October of
1995 at Circuit City and got hired shortly after.25 The job
application, which he signed, contained a clause requiring
that all employment related disputes be resolved through
arbitration.26 Two years into employment, Adams filed a
discrimination suit against the employer, but the employer
filed suit to compel arbitration.27 The district court entered
the order to compel arbitration but upon the employee’s
appeal, the circuit court reversed and found that all
Id.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
22
Andrew W. Bagley, Circuit City Stores v. Adams: The Supreme Court Strikes
a Blow in Favor of Resolving Employment Disputes Through Mandatory
arbitration
(Mar.
1,
2001),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/Circuit-CityStores-V-Adams-The-Supreme-Court-Strikes-A-Blow-In-Favor-OfResolving-Employment-Disputes-Through-Mandatory-Arbitration (last visited
Oct. 1, 2021, 11:55 AM) ("Circuit City v. Adams nonetheless represents good
news for employers seeking to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements. The
Court's construction of the FAA, which preempts most state laws that would
limit such arbitration agreements, removes a significant obstacle to these
efforts.").
23
Id.
24
Id. at 119.
25
Id. at 109.
26
Id. at 109–110.
27
Id. at 110.
20
21
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employment contracts were exempted from the FAA under
Section 1. 28 Noting that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
contradicted the decisions of other circuits and created a
circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.29
The Court first reasoned that holding all
employment contracts were exempt from the FAA would
render the specific exemptions under Section 1
superfluous.30 After analyzing Congress’ intent in the FAA,
the Court determined that the FAA’s text foreclosed the
Ninth Circuit’s construction, which would exempt all
employment contracts from the FAA’s reach. 31 On these
grounds, the Court concluded that “Section 1 exempts from
the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation
workers.”32
Circuit City Stores, Inc. is seen as the case that
opened the floodgates to mandatory arbitration agreements
in employment contracts.33 This decision certainly defined
the Court’s stance on mandatory arbitration in employeremployee contracts and settled some doubts concerning the
scope of Section 1’s exemption clause. 34 However, the
reach of the FAA only continued to expand in the cases that
followed, both in the employment context and in a general
sense. 35 Major cases in the last decade show the Court’s
Id.
Id. at 110–111.
30
Id. at 113.
31
Id. at 119.
32
Id.
33
FAA Preemption: Forcing Arbitration in the States, THE EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
ADVOCACY
INSTITUTE
FOR
LAW
AND
POLICY ,
http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/our-work/ending-forced-arbitration-in-theworkplace/justice-denied/faa-preemption-forcing-arbitration-in-the-states/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
34
Bagley, supra note 22.
35
Kristin McCandless, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: The Debate Over
Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context Rages On, 80 DENV. U.L.
REV. 225 (2002) (quoting David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect
Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 53(1997).).
28
29
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strong favor towards mandatory arbitration agreements and
its intent to continue to enforce the FAA’s public policy as
envisioned when it was enacted.36
In AT&T Mobility LLC, the Court considered
“whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the
enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of class wide arbitration procedures.”37 In 2002,
cellular consumers entered into a service contract with
AT&T, which made arbitration the solution for all disputes
between the parties, and required parties to also arbitrate
these matters in their individual capacities, not allowing the
use of class actions.38 Furthermore, the contract advertised
a provision which seemed to include free phones; however,
the consumers were still charged for sales tax on the retail
value of the free phone.39
The misled consumers filed suit in a federal district
court against AT&T, which was consolidated with a putative
class action, but AT&T moved to compel arbitration based
on the terms of the service contract. 40 The district court
denied AT&T’s motion, finding that “the arbitration
provision was unconscionable because AT&T had not
shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the
deterrent effects of class actions.” 41 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.42
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that Section
2’s “saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be
invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning

Id. at 53–54.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 337.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 338.
42
Id.
36
37
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from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”43 The
Court reasoned that “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the
FAA.”44 However, the Court also found that this analysis
was more complex when a generally applicable doctrine
such as unconscionability was allegedly being applied in a
way that disfavored arbitration against the FAA. 45
“Although § 2's saving clause preserves generally applicable
contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.” 46 Therefore,
because the purpose of the FAA is to enforce arbitration
agreements according to their terms to facilitate streamlined
proceedings, “[r]equiring the availability of classwide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.”47 Indeed, the Court found that California’s Discover
Bank rule, which classified most collective-arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable, was
preempted by the FAA “[b]ecause it ‘stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’”48
Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership
reaffirmed the Court’s position that states cannot enact laws
that directly or indirectly disfavor arbitration.49 Here, two
unrelated individuals used their power of attorney to place
their respective family members in a Kindred nursing
Id. at 339 (quoting Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996)).
44
Id. at 341.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 343.
47
Id. at 344.
48
Id. at 352 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
49
See generally Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421
(2017).
43
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home.50 The nursing home required both individuals to sign
arbitration agreements governing all disputes arising out of
the family members’ stay at the facility.51 After the passing
of their family members, both individuals brought suit in
Kentucky state court.52 Kindred moved to dismiss based on
the arbitration agreements, but both the district and appellate
courts denied the motion.53 The Kentucky Supreme Court
consolidated the two cases and found that the state’s clearstatement rule applied, meaning that “an agent could deprive
her principal of an ‘adjudication by judge or jury’ only if the
power of attorney ‘expressly so provide[d].’”54
The U.S. Supreme Court found that rules that
“single[] out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment”
are contrary to the FAA.55 The Court began by noting that
the FAA allows a court to “invalidate an arbitration
agreement based on ‘generally applicable contract defenses’
like fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules that
‘apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’” 56
Therefore, it reasoned that the FAA preempts rules that
discriminate against arbitration on their face as well as those
that accomplish the same goal by covertly discriminating
against contracts with the attributes of arbitration
agreements. 57 The Court held that because Kentucky’s
clear-statement rule hinged “on the primary characteristic of
an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of the right to
go to court and receive a jury trial . . . [s]uch a rule is too

Id. at 1425.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1426 (quoting Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306,
329 (Ky. 2015)).
55
Id. at 1425.
56
Id. at 1426 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339
(2011)).
57
Id.
50
51
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tailor-made to arbitration agreements” and is therefore
invalidated under the FAA.58
On May 21, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis in which it emphasized that
“Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements . . .
must be enforced as written.” 59 Specifically, the Court
addressed the question of whether employers and employees
are allowed to agree that all mandatory arbitrations must be
brought on a one-on-one basis or if the right to form a class
action should always exist.60
This decision consolidated three different cases,
which all involved an individual employee who attempted to
sue as a class or collective action but had signed a mandatory
arbitration agreement requiring that such arbitrations be
conducted individually.61 All employees in question argued
that their claims were not barred from court by the FAA
because the saving clause of the FAA removes agreements
that violate some other federal law. 62 Specifically, they
argued that requiring individualized arbitration violated the
National Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”) protection of
concerted activities.63
The Court noted that “the saving clause does not
save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by
more subtle methods, such as by ‘interfer[ing] with
fundamental attributes of arbitration.’” 64 The Court
reasoned that because the employees objected to the
agreements’ individualized arbitration requirement, rather
than a generally applicable defense as to how the contract
was formed, “the employees' argument seeks to interfere
Id. at 1427.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
60
Id. at 1619.
61
Id. at 1616.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1622 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339
(2011)).
58
59

185
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with one of arbitration's fundamental attributes.” 65
Furthermore, even if the illegality argument was available,
the NLRA’s “concerted activities” focuses on the right to
organize unions and collective bargaining, not the
preservation of a right to class or collective actions by
employees.66 On these grounds, the Court ruled that “[i]n
the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal
courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their
terms—including terms providing for individualized
proceedings.”67
Finally, in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, the Court
considered “whether the FAA . . . bars an order requiring
class arbitration when an agreement is not silent, but rather
‘ambiguous’ about the availability of such arbitration.” 68
The Court found that “[l]ike silence, ambiguity does not
provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties to an
arbitration agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[] the principal
advantage of arbitration.’”69
Here, a hacker tricked an employee of Lamps Plus
into providing tax information for almost 1,300 of the
company’s employees, and filed a fraudulent tax return in
the name of one of those employees whose information was
disclosed.70 This same employee had signed an arbitration
agreement when he began to work for Lamps Plus.71 The
employee brought suit in a federal district court on behalf of
a putative class, whose members also had their information
leaked during the same incident, but Lamps Plus moved to
compel arbitration on an individual basis based on the
employee’s arbitration agreement. 72 The district court
Id.
Id. at 1617.
67
Id. at 1619.
68
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019).
69
Id. at 1416 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1413.
72
Id.
65
66
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compelled arbitration, but it allowed the employees to move
forward in a class, rather than compelling individual
arbitration. 73 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the
agreement to be ambiguous concerning class arbitration and
applying California law that ambiguous agreements are to be
construed against the drafter.74
The U.S. Supreme Court focused on the principle
that state law is preempted where it stands as an obstacle to
the FAA, looking specifically at the conflict between
California’s contract ambiguity principle and the FAA’s
principle that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not
coercion.” 75 The Court has noted the fundamental
differences in individual versus class arbitration. 76
Therefore, “there [was] ‘reason to doubt the parties’ mutual
consent to resolve disputes through classwide arbitration.’”77
On these grounds, “courts may not infer consent to
participate in class arbitration absent an affirmative
‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so.’” 78 The Court concluded that “[c]ourts may not infer
from an ambiguous agreement that parties have consented to
arbitrate on a classwide basis.”79
The U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of the FAA
over the last two decades shows its clear intent to uphold and
continue to enforce the primary purpose for which the FAA
was enacted: to create a public policy favoring arbitration
and ensure that courts are enforcing these private agreements
according to the terms to which the parties stipulated. On
Id.
Id.
75
Id. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl. Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 681 (2010).
76
Id. at 1416.
77
Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl. Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
685–86 (2010).
78
Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684
(2010).
79
Id. at 1419.
73
74
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one hand, the Court’s decisions regarding mandatory
arbitration in the workplace have continuously strengthened
the force of these agreements and their binding nature on the
respective parties. On the other hand, and in a more general
sense, the FAA has repeatedly been found to preempt state
law and restrict states’ power to alter or affect mandatory
arbitration within their borders.
III.
#MeToo and State Legislative Action
A.
Overview of the #MeToo Movement
The #MeToo Movement brought national and
international recognition to the types of sexual harassment
that women face in both their daily and professional lives.80
According to the movement’s founder, Tarana Burke, the
movement is meant to address sexual violence specifically
and provide a framework for working toward ending it.81
The movement gained national attention in the U.S.
in 2017 after sexual harassment allegations against
Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein dominated
headlines.82 However, the movement first started in 2006
after Burke spoke with a 13-year-old girl about the sexual
abuse she was experiencing in her home.83 On October 15,
2017, actress Alyssa Milano tweeted, “[i]f you’ve been
sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to
this tweet,” which resulted in 66,000 replies and began the
#MeToo hashtag.84 “Journalists like Ronan Farrow at the
New Yorker and Jodi Kantor at the New York Times also
helped push the #MeToo conversation forward with

See generally Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time's Up Founders Explain the
Difference Between the 2 Movements—And How They're Alike, TIME (Mar. 8,
2018, 6:00 AM EST), https://time.com/5189945/whats-the-differencebetween-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
80
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dedicated investigative journalism that brought to light
numerous sexual misconduct stories.”85
Internationally, the movement has gained attention,
but not a strict adoption due to differences in culture and
judicial systems.86 The movement has been modified to the
needs of women from other countries to create new hashtags
to share their stories and build community and bring
awareness to the progress that is needed in laws regarding
defamation and women’s rights.87
The purpose of the movement is to focus on healing
and survivorship, building community, providing resources,
and giving a voice to those that have been affected. 88
Importantly for this note, which focuses on laws related to
employer-employee relationships, eight percent of rapes
occur in the workplace.89
B.
Rise of State Legislative Action for
Sexual Harassment Protection in Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s stance on
arbitration agreements and provisions, in the face of
#MeToo, a few states have passed laws banning mandatory
arbitration clauses that restrict sexual harassment claims,
including New York, New Jersey, Vermont, Washington,
California, and Maryland. 90 Such legislation has been a
reaction to the #MeToo movement with the intent of
strengthening human rights laws to combat sexual
Id.
See generally Yaqiu Wang, Rituparna Chatterjee, Yumi Ishikawa, Nina
Funnell, Rokhaya Diallo, Karen Attiah, Tamara De Anda, Mona Eltahawy,
#MeToo Is at a Crossroads in America. Around the World, It’s Just Beginning.,
Washington
Post
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/08/metoo-around-theworld/?arc404=true#Wang.
87
See id.
88
See Langone, supra note 80.
89
Statistics: Occupation, ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org/learnmore/statistics/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
90
O’Savio, supra note 3.
85
86
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harassment in the workplace.91 These states have essentially
carved out exceptions for sexual harassment claims in
mandatory arbitration agreements and clauses, arguing that
they “discourage employees from pursuing claims of sexual
harassment and conceal alleged employer misconduct from
the public.”92 As of now, only the New York and California
laws have been challenged.93
Furthermore, other states have also responded to the
movement without going as far as banning arbitration
clauses that restrict sexual harassment claims.94 Some states
have increased requirements in the workplace related to
sexual harassment.95 Responses to the #MeToo movement
by state legislatures also include restricting the use of
nondisclosure agreements in sexual assault or harassment
settlements.96 Ultimately, some argue that such legislation
increases access to justice for victims,97 while others say that
it will only cause more harm than good.98 Both sides will be
explored more in depth as this note progresses.
Keith J. Frank, State Legislation Precluding Compelled Arbitration in Sexual
Harassment Claims and the FAA, A.B.A. (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/03/c
ompelled-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/768T-9XXD].
92
O’Savio, supra note 3.
93
Id.
94
See The Latest Legislative Responses to #Metoo: New Requirements for
Sexual Harassment Training, Arbitration and Settlement Agreements in New
York and Evolving Legislation in Other States, GIBSON DUNN (May 2, 2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/latest-legislative-responses-to-metoo-newrequirements-for-sexual-harassment-training-arbitration-settlementagreements/.
95
Id.
96
Jen Argyle, David Smith, #MeToo One Year Later: The Legislative Reaction,
JD Supra (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/metoo-oneyear-later-the-legislative-85920/.
97
O’Savio, supra note 3.
98
Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time's Up Founders Explain the Difference
Between the 2 Movements—And How They're Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018,
5:21PM EST), https://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-themetoo-and-times-up-movements/. See also Helene Wasserman, Unintended
Consequences: How Legislative Responses to #MeToo May Harm Harassment
91
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IV.
Indiana
and
Mandatory
Arbitration
Agreements
A.
Indiana’s Stance on Arbitration
Agreements Based on Statutory Law
The arbitration framework in Indiana is established
by statute, not common law. 99 The Indiana Uniform
Arbitration Act (“IUAA”) is codified in the Indiana Code
from Sections 34-57-2-1 to 34-57-2-19.100 Specifically, the
IUAA reads as follows:
A written agreement to submit to arbitration is valid,
and enforceable, an existing controversy or a controversy
thereafter arising is valid and enforceable, except upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. If the parties to such an agreement stipulate in
writing, the agreement may be enforced by designated third
persons, who shall in such instances have the same rights as
a party under this chapter. This chapter also applies to
arbitration agreement between employers and employees or
between their respective representatives (unless otherwise
provided in the agreement).101
While the IUAA is based on the Uniform
Arbitration Act, which was updated to the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act in 2000 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Indiana has not yet
indicated its intent to adopt the revised version.102
There are both similarities and differences between
the IUAA and its federal counterpart, the FAA. Although,
after much debate, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled
Victims, LITTLER, WESTLAW (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.littler.com/files/227-18_westlaw_journal_employment_-_helene_wasserman.pdf.
99
Norris Cunningham & Christina L. Essex, Compelling and Staying
Arbitration
in
Indiana,
KATZ
KORIN
CUNNINGHAM,
https://kkclegal.com/uploads/documents/Compelling-and-Staying-Arbitrationin-Indiana.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/36YN-HHWF].
100
Id. See also IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1(a) (2020).
101
IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1(a) (2020).
102
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 99.
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that the FAA does indeed apply to agreements between
employers and employees,103 the IUAA explicitly states that
the statute “applies to arbitration agreement[s] between
employers and employees or between their respective
representatives.” 104 Another difference is that unlike the
FAA, the Indiana statute specifically exempts consumer
leases, sales, and loan contracts.105 However, much like the
federal government, this statute reflects the state’s strong
public policy favoring arbitration. 106 Furthermore, it
explicitly preserves defenses against mandatory arbitration
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”107
Naturally, the IUAA governs all arbitration matters
in Indiana except where it is preempted by the FAA. 108
Where the agreement in question is indeed preempted by the
FAA, the state court will apply the FAA in the place of the
IUAA.109 However, parties may contract around the IUAA
by agreeing that their arbitration agreement will instead be
governed by the FAA. 110 Although the IUAA can be
preempted by the FAA in terms of the statute’s substance
and to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements, Indiana
state law still governs such contracts when it comes to
“Indiana contract law and cannons of contract interpretation
in determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate any
dispute.”111
B.
Indiana’s Stance on Arbitration
Agreements Based on Case Law

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1(a) (2020).
Id. § 34-57-2-1(b).
106
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 99.
107
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
108
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 99.
109
See id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
103
104
105
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Often times, arbitration matters first arrive in court
upon a party’s application to compel or stay arbitration.112
When a court considers such applications, it has to answer
the two threshold questions of “whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate the particular disputes at issue and whether the
contract containing the arbitration clause is valid.” 113
However, the issue of whether the party seeking to compel
arbitration has waived their right to arbitrate the matter by
acting in a way that is inconsistent with the right to arbitrate
may also be in dispute.114 Once a court determines that an
agreement that positively answers the threshold questions
and meets the requirements under Indiana Code 34-57-2-1
exists, the court is required to compel arbitration.115
Much like the federal government, Indiana has a
strong public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.116 When construing arbitration agreements, all
doubts are resolved in favor of arbitration; however, courts
do not “extend arbitration agreements beyond the clear
language of the agreement and [courts] will not extend
arbitration agreements by construction or implication.” 117
Therefore, a court will not compel arbitration where a party
has not agreed to arbitrate the matter.118 “When considering
whether parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, a reviewing
court must attempt to determine the intent of the parties at

Id.
Harlow v. Parkevich, 868 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Id.
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 92.
115
Id.; see IND. CODE § 34-57-2-3(a) (2020).
116
Capitol Const. Servs., Inc. v. Farah, 946 N.E.2d 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(required a company to participate in arbitration in the interest of equity and
fairness). See also Welty Bldg. Co. v. Indy Fedreau Co., 985 N.E.2d 792, 798
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
117
Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 88 N.E.3d 188,
194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
118
Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., 813 N.E.2d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004); Cunningham & Essex, supra note 92.
112
113
114

193

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

19

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 6
[Vol. 22: 175, 2022]

Sexual Harassment Arbitration
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

the time the contract was made by examining the language
used to express their rights and duties.”119
An arbitration agreement governed by the IUAA “is
valid and enforceable, except upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”120 Such
traditional defenses to contracts found in Indiana’s common
law include unconscionability, fraud, duress, ambiguity, and
lack of capacity. 121 If a court finds a traditional contract
defense applicable to the arbitration agreement in question,
it cannot be said that the agreement is valid, or, by extension,
that the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.122
V.
Argument Against a Sexual Harassment
Exception in Indiana
A.
Pros and Cons of Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements for Sexual Harassment Claims
Although many argue arbitration is a harmful option
for sexual harassment or assault victims in the workplace,
many practicing arbitrators and employment lawyers believe
arbitration can be more beneficial for employees than going
to court.123 Obvious reasons may include the brevity of the
arbitration process as opposed to litigation and the
significantly reduced costs, often none for the employee, that
accompany arbitration.124
Much of the negative perception surrounding
mandatory arbitration results from misinformation and the
assumption that an employer that forces sexual harassment
claims into arbitration is hiding something, which is usually
not the case. 125 On the contrary, mandatory arbitration
Doe v. Carmel Operator, 144 N.E.3d 743, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing
Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 88 N.E.3d 188, 194
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017)).
120
IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1(a).
121
Brumley v. Commonwealth Bus. College Educ. Corp., 945 N.E.2d 770, 776
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Cunningham & Essex, supra note 92.
122
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 92.
123
Covington, supra note 7.
124
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 92.
125
Covington, supra note 7.
119

194

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss1/6

20

Cisneros: Sexual Harassment Arbitration
[Vol. 22: 175, 2022]

Sexual Harassment Arbitration
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

agreements are not necessarily always subject to this
“secrecy” of which opponents to such agreements complain
about.126 Indeed, accompanying nondisclosure agreements
bind the parties to confidentiality rather than the mandatory
arbitration agreement itself.127
As previously mentioned, Indiana has been largely
unaffected by the movement to enact sexual harassment
exceptions for mandatory arbitration in response to #MeToo
campaigns, at least in terms of legislative action, unlike other
states. This is not to say there has been no level of activism
in the state surrounding the #MeToo movement or that the
movement has not prompted any response from other subset
constituencies in Indiana, such as employers themselves.
Furthermore, it certainly is not meant to imply that these
issues do not exist in Indiana at all. However, an
examination of these responses, while valid, extend beyond
the scope of this note. At the time of the writing of this note,
Indiana has neither enacted nor has the legislature hinted an
intent to enact legislation that would ban mandatory
arbitration agreements in employer-employee relationships
for sexual harassment claims.
Though by no means exhaustive, a few factors may
explain Indiana’s lack of movement toward such legislation.
First, Indiana has a conservative nature and a public policy
favoring arbitration.128 As previously discussed, the IUAA
“reflects Indiana’s strong public policy favoring arbitration”
and covers all arbitration agreements in Indiana, including
those in employment contracts, unless otherwise indicated in
the agreement. 129 Furthermore, Indiana’s conservative

Jonathan Ence, Comment, I Like You When You Are Silent: The Future of
NDAS and Mandatory Arbitration in the Era of #MeToo, 2019 U. MO. L. Rev.
165, 166 (2019).
127
Id. at 167.
128
Id.
129
Cunningham & Essex, supra note 99, at 2.
126
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nature lends itself to favoring freedom of contract in the
workplace and agreements between private parties.130
Second, few sexual harassment claims actually go
to arbitration. 131 Only about 3.5% of the American
Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) arbitrated matters
between 2014 and 2016 were related to sexual
harassment. 132 Given this fairly small percentage in the
grand scheme of arbitration cases, sexual harassment does
not appear to be a prevailing issue in arbitration matters.
Therefore, it is a disproportionate response to ban all
workplace sexual harassment claims from arbitration, given
the small number of sexual harassment claims that actually
go to arbitration. Other factors may also contribute to such
a small percentage of sexual harassment claims in arbitration.
One such factor may be that not all employers actually
require mandatory arbitration because doing so may not be
in their respective best interests.133 For example, employers
may prefer a waiver of jury trial to seek a bench ruling,
which is perceived as more objective.134 Another reason that
an employer may not necessarily prefer mandatory
arbitration is that while arbitration may be cheaper for

See, e.g., Brian Howey, Indiana’s Deep Historical Conservative Roots,
DAILY
NEWS
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://www.greensburgdailynews.com/opinion/columns/indianas-deephistorical-conservative-roots/article_6c9d34e9-4a54-56fa-90941ad9478e32b3.html; Michael W. Padgett, Indiana Adopts Right-to-Work Law,
JACKSONLEWIS (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/resourcespublication/indiana-adopts-right-work-law; Christopher Hagenow, Oral
Contracts Are Enforceable in Indiana…, BLACKWELL, BURKE & RAMSEY, P.C.:
BLOG,
CONTRACTS,
REAL
ESTATE
(July
2,
2015),
https://bbrlawpc.com/2015/07/oral-contracts-in-indiana/ (illustrating private
agreement between two parties in real estate context).
131
Covington, supra note 7.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
130
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employees, the employer typically takes on a large share of
those costs in arbitration.135
Third, the #MeToo movement has changed the
discourse around workplace sexual harassment. Opponents
of mandatory arbitration may argue that the low number of
arbitration cases related to sexual harassment is a result of
women being afraid to come forward and face possible
backlash from their employers and coworkers.136 Certainly,
that fear may affect some sexual harassment victims.
However, while fear of being shamed may have led to lower
sexual harassment arbitrations in the past, the #MeToo
movement has largely changed this by “spurr[ing] change in
the way society views harassment victims, which has
prompted employers to review their human resources
policies.” 137 From this perspective, the lower number of
sexual harassment cases in arbitration may be less a result of
the fear of sexual harassment victims of coming forward, and
more likely a product of swifter action on the part of
employers to investigate and discipline where necessary in
hopes that the matter does not require arbitration.138
Fourth and finally, mandatory arbitration does not
prevent the alleged victim from seeking other forms of
nonjudicial remedies, such as filing claims with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 139 In
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
the EEOC could pursue victim-specific judicial relief
regardless of whether the employee had signed a mandatory
arbitration agreement.140

Wasserman, supra note 98 (“In arbitration, the employer pays the arbitrator
fees, significant administrative fees and the typical costs and fees that are also
inherent in any litigation.”).
136
Covington, supra note 7.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002).
135
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Here, the employee signed a mandatory arbitration
agreement for all claims arising from employment and was
fired only sixteen days after starting work and suffering a
seizure while at work. 141 Though the employee never
initiated arbitration, he filed an Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”) discrimination complaint with the
EEOC.142
The EEOC brought suit on the employee’s behalf in
federal district court, but the employer filed a petition under
the FAA to compel arbitration based on the employee’s
agreement even though the employee himself was not a party
to the case. 143 The appellate court found that a valid
arbitration agreement did exist but that it did not bind the
EEOC because they were not a party to the agreement.144
Still, the appellate court determined “that the EEOC was
precluded from seeking victim-specific relief in court
because the policy goals expressed in the FAA required
giving some effect to [the employee]'s arbitration agreement”
and, more specifically, because the EEOC is primarily
concerned with securing the public’s interests more so than
those of private individuals.145
The U.S. Supreme Court first examined the EEOC’s
enforcement power under Title VII, finding that the agency
had the ability to seek injunctive, compensatory, and
punitive relief and that an arbitration agreement between the
employer and employee did not alter those statutory
enforcement powers.146 Additionally, the Court examined
the FAA’s purpose and the binding nature on parties to such
agreements and found that “[t]he FAA does not mention
enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the enforceability
of private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise does not
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283.
143
Id. at 283–84.
144
Id. at 284.
145
Id. at 284–85.
146
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 at 286–88.
141
142
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purport to place any restriction on a nonparty's choice of a
judicial forum.”147 Because the EEOC was not a party to the
agreement, nor did it agree to arbitrate its claims, the Court
concluded that the EEOC was not bound by the employee’s
arbitration agreement as a nonparty and that “the pro
arbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the agency
to relinquish its statutory authority if it has not agreed to do
so.”148
1.
The
Pros of Mandatory
Arbitration
Despite the negative connotations that opponents of
mandatory arbitration have assigned to it,149 the reality is
that arbitration provides several benefits for the involved
parties. Arbitration in the workplace context, even in sexual
harassment cases, is no exception.150 For instance, although
arbitrators are often inclined to “split the baby,” meaning
that the parties’ demands are typically split down the middle
without either party having to make major concessions, it is
often still skewed in favor of the employee, while a bench
ruling may be significantly “more reasoned and
objective.”151 One could arguably say that if an employer
were to seek a waiver of jury trial rather than a mandatory
arbitration agreement, the employee would be in a more
disadvantaged position.152
Because the dangers of employer secrecy are such a
prominent argument against mandatory arbitration, it is
essential to note that mandatory arbitration itself is not
inherently confidential.153 Instead, the confidentiality that is
often referenced stems from either a confidentiality
agreement signed during the arbitration process or from a
Id. at 289.
Id. at 294.
149
See infra, Part V.A.2.
150
Covington, supra note 7.
151
Id.
152
See id.
153
Id.
147
148
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nondisclosure agreement that accompanies the employee’s
arbitration agreement. 154 However, confidentiality that
stems from the specific terms of the arbitration agreement
itself is not an inherent trait of mandatory arbitration
agreements.155
Another benefit of mandatory arbitration is that it
allows both parties to have a say in selecting the arbitrators
and determining terms of discovery, schedules, and available
remedies. 156 In fact, issues in arbitration proceedings are
often linked back to a party’s failure to make full use of the
customizability of arbitration and its various tools. 157
Taking advantage of these aspects of arbitration may be very
beneficial to the sexual harassment victim by ensuring that
it is closer to litigation, assuming the victim truly believes
that is in their best interest.
Depending on their contract, employees can also
often opt out of the mandatory arbitration provisions after
beginning employment.158 While the employee can opt out
of some provisions at any point after the commencement of
employment, others require the employee to do so within a
certain period of time after.159 This ability to opt out is not
“standard” in all mandatory arbitration agreements, but it is
fairly common. 160 However, the specific terms always
depend on the parties’ specific agreement.
Furthermore, employers almost always pay 100%
of all arbitration and related costs, making it much cheaper
than litigation for an employee.161 The availability of this
avenue to seek a remedy actually creates a path of easier
Id.
Id.
Covington, supra note 7.
157
Id.
158
Wasserman, supra note 98, at 2.
159
Id.
160
Covington, supra note 7.
161
Wasserman, supra note 98, at 2.
154
155
156
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access to justice as a result of the limited economic
hurdles. 162 On the other hand, sexual harassment victims
may actually be dissuaded from bringing forward their
claims if litigation is the only option, since the employee
may not necessarily have the means to cover the costs of
litigation, or because the employee’s economic priorities lie
in other areas.163
The last prominent benefit of arbitration is that it is
significantly more efficient than the judicial process, and
without the option of arbitration, courts would be even
further burdened, leading to greater delays. 164 This itself
was one of the reasons for the FAA and its public policy
favoring arbitration.165 It is no secret that courts are already
fully packed and heavily burdened.166 Arbitration eases this
burden in two ways. First, arbitration eases the caseload
burden of the courts. 167 Second, arbitration allows for a
swifter resolution of matters than litigation along with
quicker access to justice and a remedy for the victim.168
2.
The Cons of Mandatory
Arbitration
Among the leading arguments against mandatory
arbitration clauses is that they “discourage employees from
pursuing claims of sexual harassment and conceal alleged
See id.
See id. at 2–3.
164
Id.
165
JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 2–
3 (2017).
166
Lyle Moran, Court Backlogs Have Increased by an Average of One-Third
During the Pandemic, AM. BAR. ASS’N J. (Aug. 31, 2021, 12:57 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/many-state-and-local-courts-haveseen-case-backlogs-rise-during-the-pandemic-new-report-finds; Wasserman,
supra note 91, at 2.
167
Katherine V. W. Stone & Alexander J. S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic:
Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of Their Rights,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015) [hereinafter “Epidemic”],
https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf.
168
See SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 165 at 6, 10.
162
163
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employer misconduct from the public.”169 This may be the
case because arbitration is viewed as a more internal or
private process. 170 Furthermore, opponents may perceive
that an employee would assume that the process is rigged in
favor of the employer.171 However, mandatory arbitration is
not inherently confidential. 172 Many aspects of litigation
may also chill victims’ desires to pursue their claims, such
as the high costs of litigation or the victims’ personal desires
to not relive such experiences or air out such personal
accounts in court.173
Opponents of arbitration argue that arbitrators are
not neutral because they are picked and paid for by the
employer. 174 However, fees are set by the arbitration
organization (e.g. the AAA),175 and both parties have a say
in who the arbitrator will be.176 Additionally, to say that
arbitrators would not remain neutral would be to undermine
the entire arbitration system and to imply that arbitrators are
willing to ignore their professional code of ethics.177
Another popular argument states that courts tend to
favor employees, while arbitration tends to favor
employers. 178 However, the statistics relied on for such
assertions do not consider state versus federal courts, nor do
they consider jury versus judge decisions.179 Additionally,

O’Savio, supra note 3.
Stone & Colvin, supra note 167.
171
Id.
172
Covington, supra note 7.
173
Wasserman, supra note 98, at 2.
174
See Covington, supra note 7.
175
Rules, Forms & Fees, AM. A RB. ASS’N, https://adr.org/Rules (last visited
Oct. 14, 2020).
176
Covington, supra note 7.
177
See Stone & Colvin, supra note 167.
178
Alexander J. S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration: Access
to the Courts is Now Barred for More Than 60 Million American Workers,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U746-Q8AT]; Epidemic, supra note 167.
179
See Colvin, supra note 178; Stone & Colvin, supra note 167.
169
170
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although arbitrators often “split the baby,” the process often
favors the employee.180
Lastly, opponents of arbitration also argue that it is
harder for a victim to secure a lawyer for arbitration than for
litigation.181 On the contrary, litigation may make it harder
for victims to secure a lawyer because many take these cases
on a contingency fee basis. 182 Contingency fee attorneys
may turn down traditionally litigated cases, due to the longer
completion time compared to arbitrated cases, knowing that
they will not get paid for a while.183 Alternatively, lawyers
billing at an hourly rate make it significantly more expensive,
and often unaffordable, for most individual clients to pursue
traditional litigation.184
3.
Consequences
of
Banning
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
In addition to the ordinary pros and cons of
mandatory arbitration, banning mandatory arbitration
agreements for claims related to workplace sexual
harassment would bring about its own set of unintended
consequences. 185 First, while some women may want to
draw public attention to the issue at large, many women
would not want to air out these issues in a public court.186
However, banning such agreements would do exactly that
and leave the victim without any other recourse but to relive
those experiences in open court.187
Second, litigation may drag matters on for a
significantly longer time than arbitration; consequently, it
will also be longer before the victim receives any form of
Covington, supra note 7.
See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards
Justice in Employment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
155, 183 (2019).
182
Wasserman, supra note 98, at 2.
183
See id.
184
Id.
185
See id.
186
Id. at 2–3.
187
See id. at 1–2.
180
181
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compensation or other remedy.188 Not only does this delay
procure a remedy, but it also creates greater costs for the
victim in terms of attorney’s fees.189 In the end, it seems to
result in a double loss for the victim.
The culmination of these unintended consequences
may result in victims not raising their claims and never
obtaining any form of justice.190 Many victims may forgo
bringing forward their claims if their only option for
recourse involves being forced to relive awful experiences
in court and depositions. In this way, the victims weigh
pursuing justice against the perceived shame and
embarrassment inherent with this particular claim. 191
Additionally, the high costs related to litigation may leave
victims not only unwilling but also completely unable to
bring forward their claims.192 If increasing access to justice
is the primary argument for banning mandatory arbitration
in workplace sexual harassment claims, it seems that
banning such agreements is not only unwise but also
contradictory and detrimental to their purpose and goals.193
B.
The Likely Preemption of State
Exceptions for Sexual Harassment Claims to Mandatory
Arbitration
All fifty states in the U.S. have their own state law
that governs mandatory arbitration alongside the FAA. 194
Furthermore, many states have attempted to require judicial
forums for certain issues deemed unfair or unsuitable for
Wasserman, supra note 98, at 2.
Id. (noting that an attorney “may elect to charge hourly fees” which many
victims cannot afford. However, the author also notes that “[w]hile many states
permit prevailing parties to recover attorney fees separately from any judgment,
there still needs to be a judgment, and a fee award, before the employee’s
lawyers are paid.”).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See id. But see Sternlight, supra note 181, at 170 (discussing the primary
argument against mandatory arbitration agreements).
194
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 168, at 5.
188
189
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arbitration. 195 This is exactly the way that states have
responded to the #MeToo movement.196 Because Section 2
of the FAA limits the grounds on which a court may refuse
to enforce an arbitration agreement, courts usually find that
the FAA preempts state laws that restrict the enforcement of
such agreements.197 In fact, “the Court has routinely held
that the FAA supersedes state requirements that restrain the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements.”198
The FAA’s preemption over state law stems from
the federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.199 Preemption
typically occurs where state law is inconsistent with federal
law. 200 When this occurs, either because the goals of the
statutes cannot both be achieved consistently or the language
of the two is contradictory, the federal statute preempts the
state statute, and the state statute is void.201
The two general types of preemption are express
and implied preemption. 202 Express preemption concerns
the specific language of the federal statute written to preempt
state law, while implied preemption concerns instances in
which federal law cannot achieve its goals because state law
acts as a barrier. 203 The FAA does not contain express
language that preempts state law, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that based on implied preemption, the FAA
preempts state laws that act as barriers to the achievement of
the FAA’s objectives.204
Part II of this note sets out how the U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently extended the FAA’s reach. Not only
Id.
See O’Savio, supra note 3.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 5.
200
Id. at 5–6.
201
Id. at 6.
202
O’Savio, supra note 3, at 6.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 6–7.
195
196
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has the Court extended its reach, but it has also consistently
upheld the FAA’s preemption over state law. 205 At its
foundation, the FAA states that “[a] written agreement to
submit to arbitration is valid, and enforceable . . . except
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract . . . .”206 Though contract law is
left to the states, the general categories of defenses against
contracts available among states are fairly consistent. 207
However, the details of those defenses may vary.208
Among the first FAA cases that the Court
entertained, the Court concluded in Southland Corp. v.
Keating that that the FAA could apply in state courts—just
the same as in federal courts—and that California’s statute,
which acted to compel judicial review even in the presence
of a mandatory arbitration agreement, was preempted by the
FAA. 209 The Court reasoned that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the
[FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”210 In
many cases since Southland Corp., the Court has restated its
position that the FAA evinces “a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration.”211 Similarly, the Court
has found that “Congress has instructed that arbitration
agreements . . . must be enforced as written.”212
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 165, at 5, 7.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
207
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 165, at 9–10. Generally applicable
contract defenses include “fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” Id. at 9 n.91
(quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)).
208
See SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 165, at 11.
209
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1984).
210
Id. at 10.
211
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S., 1, 24,
(1983)).
212
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
205
206
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“Although § 2's saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent
to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.”213 It is evident
from the Court’s statement that state laws that disfavor
arbitration or interfere with the FAA’s fundament attributes
are likely preempted by federal law. 214 Furthermore, the
Court has specified that “[w]hen state law prohibits outright
the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the
FAA.”215 This principle hits the very argument behind the
likely preemption of state statutes that seek to bar mandatory
arbitration in sexual harassment claims. By carving out
these exceptions, states are putting themselves in a position
that outright prohibits the arbitration of a particular type of
claim, that is, sexual harassment claims. 216 Challenges to
such laws, as in New York and California, are already
highlighting how states cannot carve out exceptions to
arbitration agreements for sexual harassment claims because
these statutes interfere with the FAA’s objectives in
violation of the Supremacy Clause by prohibiting employers
from requiring arbitration for sexual harassment claims.217
In addition to the Court’s repeated findings that
federal law preempts state laws standing as barriers to the
objectives of the FAA, “[i]n many cases over many years,
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
Id. at 344, 364; see also Phoebe Bodurtha, Can States Ban Mandatory
Arbitration of Harassment Cases?, ON LABOR (May 30, 2019),
https://www.onlabor.org/can-states-ban-mandatory-arbitration-of-harassmentcases/#:~:text=Most%20notably%2C%20Maryland%2C%20New%20York,ar
bitration%20agreements%20under%20federal%20law [https://perma.cc/32C96V2K.
215
AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 341. See also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S.
346, 353 (2008).
216
Bodurtha, supra note 214.
217
Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078 (E.D. Cal. 2020);
Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 18 CV 11528, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107020 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019); see also O’Savio, supra note 3; Frank, supra
note 91.
213
214
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[the U.S. Supreme Court] has heard and rejected efforts to
conjure conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other
federal statutes. In fact, the Court has rejected every such
effort to date (save one temporary exception since
overruled) . . . .”218
Based on the Court’s treatment of FAA preemption
over state law in its decisions, states are fairly limited in the
restrictions that can be placed on mandatory arbitration. 219
As to the issue of banning mandatory arbitration in sexual
harassment claims, the FAA would almost certainly preempt
such state laws. Not only do such statutes stand as barriers
to the objectives of the FAA and disfavor arbitration, but
they also prohibit a particular type of claim. Should Indiana
enact a similar law, it would face a steep uphill battle on the
hill of preemption.
For the foregoing reasons, Indiana should not, and
is unlikely to, codify an exception to mandatory arbitration
agreements for sexual harassment claims in the workplace.
Not only do the pros outweigh the cons, but the cons are
based on flawed, incomplete arguments with a great deal of
speculation.
Additionally, a statutory exception to
mandatory arbitration agreements for sexual harassment
claims in the workplace would raise a great deal of
unintended consequences that would further discourage
victims from bringing their claims. Overall, such an
exception in Indiana would be detrimental and stand as an
obstacle to justice for sexual harassment victims.
VI.
Conclusion
The #MeToo movement has certainly gained
momentum at a very fast rate since its “reignition” in
2017. 220 Furthermore, it has attracted both the American
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018); Bodurtha, supra
note 214.
219
See SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 165, at 7–11.
220
See Elena Nicolaou & Courtney E. Smith, A #MeToo Timeline To Show
How Far We’ve Come—& How Far We Need To Go, REFINERY 29 (October 5,
218
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public and world’s attention to a very important issue. 221
The reality is that many women, and even men, face sexual
harassment in the workplace on a regular basis, and it is an
issue that warrants acknowledgement and action.222 Indeed,
states have listened to their constituents and responded
through legislative action with all the right intentions.
However, the reality is that such laws banning mandatory
arbitration for sexual harassment claims face not just an
uphill battle, but rather clear barriers of preemption under
the FAA as is evident from the U.S. Supreme Court’s firm,
precedent-grounded public policy of favoring arbitration and
enforcing such private agreements according to their
terms. 223 Such laws may also bring about unintended
consequences that hinder, rather than benefit, victims.
Additionally, the arguments laid out by advocates
for prohibiting mandatory arbitration in sexual harassment
claims face barriers of their own. Not only do the pros
outweigh the cons of mandatory arbitration, but arguments
against such agreements stand in contradiction to the
realistic circumstances and outcomes of the world of
arbitration. In fact, the movement’s most popular argument
takes issue not with arbitration agreements, but rather
nondisclosure agreements.
The circumstances surrounding arbitration in
Indiana also strongly demonstrate why the state is unlikely
to follow suit in passing legislation to prohibit mandatory
arbitration in claims of sexual harassment.
Such
circumstances include its statutory and common law stances
on arbitration as well as the nature of the state as a whole and
policies in the workplace. In light of the factors underlying
Indiana’s current lack of legislative movement, the
arguments for and against mandatory arbitration, and the
2019, 9:55 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/10/212801/me-toomovement-history-timeline-year-weinstein.
221
Id.
222
See Statistics: Occupation, supra note 89.
223
See O’Savio, supra note 3; Frank, supra note 91.
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preemption issues surrounding state laws banning
mandatory arbitration, it is in the best interest of sexual
harassment victims and the state itself for Indiana to refrain
from passing legislation that prohibits employers from
requiring mandatory arbitration in sexual harassment cases.
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